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Summary findings
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the preferences of a foreign firm and the host country  by restrictions on foreign direct investment that induce
government with respect to these two modes of foreign  the foreign firm to choose the socially preferred mode of
direct investment in the presence of costly technology  entry.
transfer. The tradeoff between technology transfer and
market competition emerges as a key determinant of
preferences.
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Host countries often associate inflows of foreign direct  investment  (FDI)
with  a  wide variety  of benefits, the most common of which are transfers  of
modern  technologies and more competitive  product  markets.  Perhaps  sur-
prisingly, restrictions  on FDI  are also fairly common.  The  most  frequently
observed  policy  restrictions  are those  on the  number  of foreign firms  and
on the  extent  of foreign ownership allowed.  The  pattern  of these  restric-
tions  differs across countries and  often acress sectors  within countries.  For
instance,  consider policy in basic telecommunications services.  At one end,
in  the Philippines,  a  high  degree of competition  co-exists with  limitations
on foreign equity  partnership.  Bangladesh and  Hong Kong are examples of
countries  that  have no limitations  on foreign ownership, but  both  have mo-
nopolies in the  international  telephony and  oligopolies in other  segments of
the  market.  The  objective  of this  paper  is to  shed light  on  the economic
rationale  behind these restrictions.
The paper develops a simple model of FDI,  where a foreign firm can choose
between two modes of entry:  direct entry wherein the foreign firm establishes
a wholly-owned subsidiary  that  competes  with  domestic firms, and  acquisi-
tion of an existing domestic firm (we also allow for partial  acquisition).  The
foreign firm's mode  of entry  affects both  the extent  of technology  transfer
and  the degree of competition  in the host country.  Divergence between the
foreign firm's choice and  the welfare interest  of the  domestic  economy can
create the basis for policy intervention.
Resiuts  suggest  that  when a  foreign firm faces high  costs of technology
transfer,  it will generally prefer direct  entry to  acquisition.  This  is because
a high cost  of technology  transfer  is associated  with  a smaller  cost advan-
tage  over domestic  firms and  a high acquisition  price.  The  government  on
the other  hand  will prefer acquisition  because it leads to  a  larger extent  of
technology  transfer  by the  foreign firm and  a  relatively  higher  acquisition
iprice for the domestic  firm.  The higher technology  transfer  under  acquisi-
tion partly  offsets its  anti-competitive  effect which when combined with  the
larger producer surplus under  acquisition makes it more attractive  relative to
direct  entry.  Thus,  when costs of technology transfer  increase sharply  with
the extent  of technology transfer,  restricting  direct  entry  in order to  induce
acquisition,  even in highly concentrated  markets,  can help achieve a higher
level of welfare in the host country.
On the other  hand,  if the cost  of technology transfer  is low, the govern-
ment prefers direct  entry  to acquisition.  Under this  scenario, direct  entry  is
not  only associated  with a more competitive  domestic market,  but  will also
brings more technology transfer  due to the foreign firm's stronger  'strategic'
incentive to transfer  technology.  But,  the foreign firm would rather  acquire
an existing  firm.  Not only does acquisition yield greater  market  power but
also the  acquisition  price is  small  when the  cost  of technology  transfer  is
low. Under  this  scenario, restricting  foreign equity  (i.e., acquisition)  in ex-
isting domestic firms becomes desirable if it help induce direct entry, even in
relatively  competitive markets.
Policy interventions, both in terms of foreign equity restrictions  and direct
entry may then be justified  in oligopolistic markets.  Note that  the objective
of these policies interventions  is not to  restrict  access by foreign firms into
the domestic market,  but  rather  to induce a different mode of entry.
ii1  Introduction
Host countries often associate inflows of foreign direct  investment  (FDI)  with
a wide variety of benefits, the most common of which are transfers  of modern
technologies and  more competitive  product  markets.  Perhaps  surprisingly,
restrictions  on  FDI  are also fairly common.  The  most  frequently  observed
policy restrictions  are those on the number of foreign firms and on the extent
of foreign ownership allowed. The pattern  of these restrictions  differs across
countries  and often  across sectors  within  countries.  For instance,  consider
policy in basic telecommunications services. At one end, in the Philippines,
a high degree of competition co-exists with limitations on foreign equity part-
nership.  Bangladesh and Hong Kong are examples of countries that  have no
limitations  on foreign ownership, but  both  have monopolies in  the interna-
tional  telephony  and  oligopolies in other segments of the market.  Pakistan
and Sri Lanka have allowed limited foreign equity  participation  in monopo-
lies to strategic  investors,  and  deferred the  introduction  of competition  for
several years.  Korea, however, is allowing increased foreign equity participa-
tion more gradually than competition.  The objective of this paper is to shed
light on the economic rationale  behind these restrictions.'
The paper develops a simple model of FDI,  where a foreign firm can choose
between two modes of entry:  direct entry wherein the foreign firm establishes
a wholly-owned subsidiary  that  competes with  domestic firms,  and  acquisi-
tion of an existing domestic  firm (we also allow for partial  acquisition).  In
our model, the foreign firm's mode of entry affects both  the extent  of technol-
ogy transfer  and the  degree of competition  in the host  country.  Divergence
between  the foreign firm's  choice and  the  welfare interest  of the  domestic
economy can create the  basis for policy intervention.  We provide conditions
'Political  economy  explanations  associated  with  domestic  and  foreing  lobbying  may
also help explain  these restrictions,  but  we abstract  from them  in this  paper.
1under  which such divergence arises and show that  policy restrictions  on FDI
may force the foreign firm to adopt the government's preferred mode of entry.
The  policy considerations  that  arise in  our model  are most  relevant to
situations  where  cross-border  delivery is  either  infeasible or not  the  most
efficient mode of supply.  For example, in many services, ranging  from con-
struction  to  local  telecommunications,  the  protection  granted  to  national
suppliers and  social welfare, depend  directly on the restrictions  on FDI.2 In
our model, FDI  can lead to  enhanced competition  and  serve as a  vehicle for
transferring  technology, but the relative strengths  of these effects depends on
the form that  FDI  takes.  The competition  enhancing  effect of FDI  is greater
under  direct  entry.  But  one mode  does not  unambiguously  dominate  the
other  in terms  of the extent  of technology transfer.  On the  one hand,  the
relatively  larger market  share  that  the foreign finn  enjoys under  acquisition
increases its  incentive for transferring  costly technology  ('scale'  effect).  On
the other hand,  technology transfer may be larger under  direct  entry  due to
the stronger  incentive  that  the  foreign firm has to  transfer  technology  in a
more competitive  market  environment  ('strategic  effect').  In  any case,  the
spectrum of observed policy choices may partly  reflect the balancing  by gov-
ermnents  of these conflicting considerations  in their  specific circumstances.
Our  formal  model  is a  three  stage  game  where,  in  the  first  stage,  the
foreign firm chooses its mode of entry. Subsequently, it chooses the extent  of
technology to transfer to its subsidiary.  In the last stage, all firms compete in
the domestic market.  FDI policy is set prior to the first stage of the game by
the host  country  government.  We begin with  a  benchmark  model in which
the domestic market is a monopoly (section 2) and later  generalize the model
to the case of an arbitrary  number of domestic firms (section  3).
2This assumption allow us to abstract from the decision facing foreign firms (or gov-
ernments) which otherwise would have to choose between investing abroad or exporting
to the host country.
2To anticipate  the  results,  it  is shown that  for high  costs  of technology
transfer, the government generally prefers acquisition to direct entry, whereas
the foreign firm chooses direct entry. Thus, restricting direct entry in order to
induce acquisition can improve welfare, even m highly concentrated  markets.
On the other hand,  if the cost of technology transfer is low, the government
prefers direct entry whereas the foreign firm would rather  acquire an existing
domestic competitor.  In such a case, restricting the acquisition of the existing
domestic  firm, say via the use of equity  restrictions,  can help improve host
country welfare by inducing direct entry by the foreign firm, even in relatively
competitive  markets.  Finally, for intermediate  costs of technology  transfer,
both  the government and the foreign firm prefer acquisition to  direct entry.3
Some of the  issues addressed  here have been studied  separately  before,
but  we know of no analytical study  of the  relationship  between  technology
transfer  and  mode  of FDI  (as in  direct  entry  versus acquisition).4 One of
the first rigorous  analyses of partial  acquisitions  (or joint  ventures)  was by
Svejnar and Smith (1984), which demonstrated  that  the distribution  of equity
shares did not  play a critical role in determining  the tax  burden  of the new
firm as long  as  the  firms  bargained  over  transfer  prices.  But  their  focus
was more on the interaction  of transfer pricing and local policy; they allowed
neither for technology transfer  nor for the possibility of direct entry.  A recent
paper  by  Al-Saadon  and  Das  (1996) constructed  a  model of international
joint  venture  in which ownership shares  were endogenously  determined  as
the  outcome  of bargaining  between a  multinational  firm and  a  single host
firm. They show that  complementary  choices (taxes or subsidies by the host
3An important  assumption  throughout  the  paper  is that  FDI  exists  in perfectly  elastic
supply to  the host country  regardless of policy  interventions.
4The literature  has tended to focus on licensing and  direct entry where  the foreign firm
seeks to prevent  the  dissipation  of its technological  advantage  (see Ethier  and  Markusen,
1996, Markusen,  2001, and  Saggi,  1996, 1999). Yu and  Tang (1992) discuss several  poten-
tial  motivations  for international  acquisition  of firms.  These  include:  cost reduction,  risk
sharing,  and  competition  reduction  (also a consideration  in our  framework).
3country government, and transfer prices for inputs by the multinational  firm)
may influence the  equity  distribution  of the joint  venture.  But  again  the
foreign firm was not  given the option of independent  entry  and  technology
transfer is not an issue. Lee and Shy (1992) demonstrated  that  restrictions  on
foreign ownership may adversely affect the quality of technology transferred,
but  the  foreign firm was obliged to  form a joint  venture.5 Most  recently,
Roy et  al.  (1999) examine a situation  in  which a foreign firm has  already
established  in the local market  and  consider alternative  collaborative  deals
between it  and  a  local  firm.  They  identify  the  degree  of cost  asymmetry
between the  foreign and  local firm, and  the  market  structure  as  crucial to
determining  the  optimal  choice of policy.  However, technology  transfer  is
assumed to be costless,  and so the differing incentive to  transfer  technology
under alternative  market  structures  is not considered.
2  Benchmark  model:  domestic  monopoly
There  are two  goods:  z  and  y.  Preferences  in the  domestic  economy are
quasi-linear over the two goods:
U(z, y)  =  u(z)  + y
Good y serves as a numeraire good and it is produced  under  perfect  compe-
tition  with  constant  returns  to scale technology.
A domestic incumbent firm currently  supplies good z at constant  marginal
cost c.  A foreign firm has two options  for entering  the domestic  market.  It
5Smarzynska  (2001) empirically  explores  the  mirror  image.  In  a  sample  containing
information  on foreign investment  projects  in Eastern  Europe  and  former  Soviet Union,
she founds  that  the  higher  the  quality  of  technology  to  be  transferred,  the  more likely
is the  foreign firm to  choose direct  entry  to a  joint-venture  (especially  in R&D-intensive
industries).
4can either  acquire the  domestic firm (if the  foreign firm's  share  of the  new
firm is less than  100%, we will term this  'partial'  acquisition)  or it can set
up a wholly owned subsidiary that  directly competes with the domestic firm.
The game proceeds as follows. In the first  stage, the foreign firm chooses its
mode of entry  (E  for direct  entry and  A for a acquisition).  If it wants  to
acquire the domestic firm, it makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to  the domestic
firm which specifies both a fixed transaction  price (v) and a share of the new
firm's total  profits in the output  market  (0). If the domestic firm accepts the
offer, they form a new firm in which the domestic  firm gets  1 - 9 of the total
profit and  the foreign firm gets the rest.  If the foreign firm's  offer is refused
by the domestic  firm, the foreign firm can enter  the market  by establishing
its own subsidiary.
After selecting its  mode of entry, the foreign firm chooses the  quality  of
technology it wishes to transfer  to its subsidiary.  Technology transfer lowers
the marginal  cost of production  but is a costly process (see Teece, 1976). By
incurring  the cost  C(x), the foreign firm can lower the cost of production  of
its subsidiary  in the domestic economy to c - x.  In other words, if it opts to
transfer no technology, the marginal cost of its subsidiary  equals that  of the
domestic firm.
The  last  stage of the  game involves the product  market.  In  case of ac-
quisition, the  foreign firm produces  as a monopolist;  in case of direct entry,
the foreign firm's  subsidiary  and  the  domestic  firm compete  in  a  Cournot
fashion.  Let p(q) be  the  inverse demand  function  for good z  generated  by
consumer maximization,  where q is total  consumption  of good  z.  Firm  i's
profit function  at the output  stage is given by 7ri(qi,  qj) =  (p(qi + qj) - ci)qi,
where i, j  = h, f,  ch = c, cf =  c-x  and q =  qi  + q;.  The first order conditions
for profit maximization  for firm i can be written  as:
= p +p'qi - ci = 0  (1)
( 9qi
52.1  Technology  transfer
Moving backwards,  consider the foreign firm's decision regarding  technology
transfer  in either of the two scenarios. At this stage, the ownership structure
of the  new firm (as parametrized  by 9) is taken  as given.  The  foreign firm
chooses x  to maximize its own profits:6
max  r' (q(x); x)  - C(x)  (2)
where
XA  0 7rAA(q(x); x)
To facilitate  analytical  derivations,  for the  rest of the paper,  we assume
that  the  cost of technology  transfer  is quadratic  and  the  (inverse) demand
function for good z (the relevant industry  for our analysis) is linear:
Assumption  1 (Al):  Let C(x)  =  T  where  r = 1t2C/ax2 determines  the
convexity of the cost function of technology transfer and that  q = a-p  where
p denotes the  (relative)  price of good z.7
Then, using Al,  and solving the problem in (2) gives the optimal technology
transfer  under  acquisition:
XA =O(a  -c)  (3)
2r -9 
6For exposition purposes  we assume that  the  cost of technology  transfer  is only incurred
by  the foreign firm.  Relaxing  this  assumption  would only affect results  regarding  partial
acquisition.
7Technology transfer  could take  many  forms. Had  we assume  that  technology  transfer
was demand  enhancing  (brand  name,  marketing  techniques,  etc..)  rather  than  cost reduo-
ing then  one would have to add  x to  the demand  function  specified above.  Results  would
be  totally  robust  to this  alteranative  specficiation.
6Lerna  1:  The quality of technology transferred by the foreign firm increases
uith  its share of ounership
dxA  _  92(a -c) 
dO  (2r - )2 >0
Similarly, under direct entry, the foreign finn chooses x to solve the following
problem
max'7r (qf  (x), qh(X);  X)  - C(X)  (4)
The first order condition for the above problem can be  written  as:
19 -d+  + 84 _  dC(x)
8qf  dx  Oqh  dx  Ox  dx
From  the  first  order  condition  at  the  output  stage  (see equation  1),  the
first term  of the  above equation  equals zero. The  second term  captures  the
strategic effect of technology transfer:  an increase in x lowers the output  of
the domestic  firm thereby  increasing the foreign firm's  profits  (see Brander
and  Spencer,  1983).  The third  term  captures  the stand  alone incentive for
technology transfer.  We call this the scale effect since the higher the output
of the foreign firm, the  stronger  its  incentive for technology transfer.  The
last term  simply denotes the marginal cost of technology transfer.
Solving the problem  in  (4) gives the  optimal  technology  transfer  under
direct  entry
sE_4(a  - c)
Note that  gr  - 8 > 0 if the second order condition  holds (see the  appendix,
7subsection  5.2.5).8 Note from (3) and (6) that  xA  >  XE  iff
0 > Ot  8-  r  9  (7)
Proposition  1:  The foreign firm  tmnsfers  a superior technology to its sub-
sidiary under  acquisition than under direct entry  if  its share of the acquired
firm  exceeds a certain threshold Ot.
The intuition  behind this result is as follows. First  note that  since technology
transfer  reduces the  cost of production,  the higher the sales of the enterprise
to which the technology is being transferred,  the stronger  the  foreign firm's
incentive to  transfer  technology  (thus  the  scale effect is stronger  under  ac-
quisition  than  under  direct  entry).  But,  under  acqiuisition, the  foreign firm
must share  the benefits of technology transfer  with domestic  firm whereas it
must bear the full costs itself.  Thus, the foreign firm has a stronger  incentive
for technology transfer  under acquisition if and  only if a large enough share
of the new firm's profits lies in its hands.
Note, from the right-hand-side  of (7) that  if r  <  4, then Ot is larger than
1, i.e., there exists  no feasible ownership share for which proposition 1 holds.
We thus have the following result:
Corollary  1:  The foreign firm  transfers  a superior technology to  its  sub-
sidiary under  direct entry than  to a fully  acquired firm  iff  T  < 4.
Thus, even a fully acquired firm may receive less technology than  the wholly
5 Furthermore,  since c > xE, we also need that
r  >  4(a  + c)
9c
These restrictions  are  assumed  to be  satisfied  throughout  the  paper.
8owned subsidiary  of the  foreign firm if the  cost  of technology  transfer  (-r)
is low (or to  be more precise when the cost  function of technology transfer
is not  too  convex).  The intuition  for this  result can  be understood  in the
terms  of the scale effect and  the strategic  effect.  First  note  that  the  scale
effect is stronger  under acquisition than  under direct  entry since the foreign
firm's subsidiary  produces a higher level of output  under acquisition  relative
to  direct  entry  (which involves competition  with  the  domestic  firm).  But
under  direct  entry  the  foreign firm has a strategic  incentive for technology
transfer  (as  captured  by the  second  term  in  equation  5).  As we show  in
the  appendix,  under  assumption  Al,  the strategic  incentive  for technology
transfer is proportional  to the output of the foreign firm and therefore declines
in  r.  Thus,  when  r is small,  the  strategic  effect under  direct  entry  results
in greater  technology transfer despite  the fact that  the scale effect is weaker
under direct  entry  relative to  acquisition.
2.2  Mode  of  entry
To determine  the foreign firm's  choice between acquisition and  direct  entry,
we first need to pin down its equilibrium offer (9*, v*). Consider the decision
of the domestic  firm which faces an  arbitrary  offer  (0, v)  from the  foreign
firm to enter  into joint  production  (when a  =  1, the  domestic  firm is fully
acquired).  The  domestic  firm  is willing to  accept  any  offer that  leaves it
with  a  net  payoff equal  to  that  which it  makes  under  direct  entry  by the
foreign firm.  Thus,  any offer (0, v) that  satisfies the following constraint  is
acceptable to the domestic  firm:
(1 -)irA(XA(0))  +  V >  7rE(xE)  (8)
where irE(xE)  denotes  the  profits  of the  domestic  firm under  direct  entry.
Since the  foreign firm has  all the  bargaining  power,  the  above  constraint
9binds in equilibrium.  Thus, there  exist multiple potential  combinations  (0,
v)  that  are  acceptable  to  the  domestic  firm.  Of course,  the  foreign  firm
chooses (9, v) to solve the following problem:
max97rA  (XA(9))  - C(XA(9))  - V
where we know that  the constraint  in (8) implies that
V  =  ixE(X)  -(1  9)7A(X(8))
Thus the problem confronting the foreign firm is equivalent  to
maXIr  A(xA())  _ C(XA(9))
The first order condition for the above problem implies a corner solution (due
to the envelope theorem  or from first order  condition  derived from equation
(2)):
07r  A  aCl  dxA() _  (  91)iA  dxA (0)
L  x J.  dG  9x  dO
inplying  that
=  1
Since x is chosen optimally  at  a later  date,  it  is optimal  for the foreign
firm to completely  acquire  the domestic firm and  the  domestic firm accepts
this offer since it fares no worse than the  alternative  of direct  entry.
Proposition  2:  In equilibrium, 6* = 1 and  v'  = 1rh (XE).
Since v  =  -7r  E(XE),  the domestic firm is indifferent between being acquired by
the foreign firm or competing with it under direct entry.  Since the foreign firm
strictly  prefers acquisition,  in equilibrium,  we have 9* =  1. The logic of the
acquisition result is simple:  acquisition allows the foreign firm to monopolize
10the market and since it offers  the domestic firm the lowest  transaction price
at which it is willing  to sell, the deal is acceptable to the domestic firm.
The above result has an interesting implication: when considering the
alternative modes of entry from a welfare  perspective,  we can focus  solely on
consumer welfare since the domestic firm is indifferent between acquisition
and direct entry.  Unless, the cost of technology  transfer is sufficiently  low
('r < 4), acquisition results in a superior level  of technology  being transferred
to the domestic market. However,  it also implies monopoly. Thus, the do-
mestic economy  may very well be better off under direct entry whereas the
market equilibrium  yields acquisition.
2.3  Domestic  welfare
Given proposition 2, we only need to compare price under direct entry with
price under acquisition  to determine a welfare  ranking of the two regimes:
a  a+ c  -xE  A  a +c  - A P  =+c  andp  =  2
3  2
Using equations (3) and (6), we have
9A  p  (32  - 6r + 4)(a -c)>  (9)
(2T-r-1)(9  - 8)(9
Thus, we have the following  result:
Proposition  3: Domestic  welfare is always higher under direct entry relative
to acquisition.
Given that second order conditions require r to be larger than 2 (see appen-
dix), by (9), it turns out that domestic welfare  is always higher under direct
entry whereas the foreign  firm always opts for acquisition as long as it is free
to set the terms (i.e. has all the bargaining power when making the initial
11acquisition offer to  the domestic  firm).
By corollary  1,  when r  <  4, direct  entry  results  in  greater  technology
transfer  than  acquisition.  Since competition  is always higher  under  direct
entry, domestic welfare is surely higher under direct entry when T- <  4. What
proposition 3 informs us is that,  under assumption Al,  the higher technology
transfer under  acquisition  for the case of r  > 4, is insufficient to counter  the
adverse effects of reduced  competition.
2.4  Policy  implication
The  analysis above has an  interesting  implication  regarding  the  welfare ef-
fects of equity restrictions  imposed on foreign enterprises  in many developing
countries.  Our  results  indicate  that  while domestic  welfare is higher  under
direct  entry,  the  foreign firm always prefers  full acquisition.  Imagine  that
the foreign firm faces an equity restriction  which makes it infeasible to  fully
acquire  the incumbent  domestic  firm.  What  are the  welfare implications  of
such a policy?
If 0 is not  constrained  by policy, we know from proposition  3 that  the
foreign firm prefers  to  fully acquire  the  domestic  firm.  It  is easy  to  show
by comparing  firms' profits under  acquisition  and direct  entry  that  if 0 were
a policy parameter  which the  foreign firm must  take  as a  given, it prefers
acquisition to direct  entry if
3(3'r--2)
Clearly, Op  decreases  in r:  as the  cost  function  for technology  transfer  be-
comes more convex, the foreign firm is less willing to accept a smaller share of
the new firm. If domestic policy becomes restrictive  enough, the foreign firm
is induced to  enter  the  market  directly thereby  yielding  the more desirable
outcome.  However, if domestic  policy merely  restricts  ownership  without
12making direct  entry more attractive  to the  foreign firm, it simply results  in
less technology transfer  (from lemma 1) thereby  hurting  domestic welfare:
Proposition  4:  When  there is  only one  incumbent  firm  in  the  domestic
market,  a sufficiently  strong equity restriction  improves domestic welfare by
inducing direct entry by the foreign firm.
The  main  insight  behind  the  above result  is that  a  policy restriction  on
foreign ownership  may induce the foreign firm to  adopt  a  strategy  that  is
more favorable to  the domestic economy. 9
The benchmark  model is useful for developing intuition  but  it is also an
incomplete treatment  of the issue since many markets are actually  oligopolis-
tic.  Furthermore,  in the oligopoly case, strategic  considerations  change and
the foreign firm may prefer direct entry to acquisition (see Kamien and Zang,
1990), in which case the need for government intervention may vanish.  How-
ever,  under  oligopoly, the  domestic  government  may  not  necessarily  value
direct  entry  more  than  acquisition  as domestic  producer  surplus  may  be
higher under  acquisition than  under  direct  entry  in the  oligopoly case.  To
explore these  issues, we examine  a more general  model in  which there  are
multiple  domestic firms.
3  Domestic  oligopoly
Let n  - 1 denote  the total  number of domestic  firms.  The  structure  of the
game is as follows. As before, the foreign firm makes an  offer (0, v) to one
9As we discussed  in the  Introduction,  governments  sometimes restrict  direct  entry  by
foreign firms.  We develop a more general model that  can help explain such  a policy stance.
Even in our  basic  model, restricting  direct  entry  could  increase  the  bargaining  power of
the  domestic  firm thereby  increasing  the  acquisition  price  v*.  This  is because,  if  direct
entry is infeasible,  v* wiU at least  have to equal the existing level of profits of the domestic
firm (7rh will no longer  be the  outside  option  of the  domestic  firm if direct  entry  by the
foreign firm is infeasible).
13of the incumbents  say firm i.  If firm i accepts the offer, the acquisition  takes
place.  If it  rejects it,  the foreign firm can make an offer to  any  one of the
other  incumbents  or decide to enter  the market  directly.
After  choosing its  mode of entry, the foreign firm chooses the  extent  of
technology  transfer  to  the  relevant production  unit.  In the  final stage,  all
firms compete  a la Cournot  in the product  market.
3.1  Product  market
The product  market  stage  is well understood  and  requires  little  discussion.
The output  levels of all finns are reported  in the appendix.  The crucial point
to  remember is that  in  case the  foreign firm acquires  a  domestic  firm, the
total number of firms in the market equals n-1  whereas if it enters directly, it
equals n.  Without  loss of generality, let the foreign firm's partner  be denoted
as firm n - 1.
3.2  Technology  transfer
Under  direct  entry,  the  foreign firm's  first  order  condition  for technology
transfer  can be written  as
(n-1)(  qfE)d  + qf  _r  O  (10)
where qh denotes  the output  of a typical domestic  competitor  and as can be
derived from the appendix  (subsection 5.2.1)
di=_  1-
dx  n+1
The  first term  in  (10)  is the  strategic  effect; the  second  term  is the  scale
effect and  the third  term  captures  the cost of technology transfer.  The first
order  condition  in case of acquisition  can be  recovered from equation  (10)
14by  reducing  the  number  of domestic  competitors  to  n  - 2  and  using  the
appropriate  output  levels for all  firms.  Note  that  since  qE  >  qEj,  the
scale effect is always stronger  in magnitude than  the strategic  effect, holding
constant  the mode of entry.  However, it is quite  possible that  the  strategic
effect under  direct  entry exceeds that  under acquisition.  In fact,  as we know
from the analysis of the benchmark model, the strategic effect is absent when
the  only domestic  firm is acquired.  Thus,  intuition  suggests  that,  starting
from n  =  2 (i.e.  a  single domestic  firm), the strategic  effect must  increase
with n,  at least  locally. The following proposition  formalizes this  intuition:
Proposition  5:  The strategic incentivefor  technology tmnsfer  increases with
n  if n  < nc(r)  and it decreases uwith  n if  n > nC(r)lO
Thus the strategic  effect increases with the number of existing domestic firm
as long as the domestic market  is not  too competitive.  In relatively  compet-
itive market,  the presence of an extra  firm in the  domestic  market  actually
decreases the  'strategic'  incentives to  transfer  technology.  The  reason  for
this  is  that  as the  market  gets  more  competitive,  the  scope  for  strategic
interactions  among firms is reduced.
Under  assumption  Al,  it  is  easy to  solve for the  quality  of technology
transferred  in the presence of acquisition:"1
XA  2(n - 1)(a - c)
(4n-2)  + (r  -2)n 2
" 0For  a  formal  proof,  see the  appendix  (subsection  5.2.2).  Alternatively,  we state  the
above proposition  as follows:
dS(,r)  >  0 when  r  < rC(n) _  2n)(n  )  )
dn  -(  )n-3
"For  a discussion of  the  second order  conditions  and  other  parameter  restrictions  im-
plied by  the  model, see the  appendix.
15Similarly, the technology transferred  to  the subsidiary  under  direct  entry  is
given by:
E  2n(a-c)
(T-  2)n2 + (2n + 1)r
The equilibrium  technology transfers  have reasonable properties:  under both
direct entry and  acquisition, technology transfer  diminishes with  n as well as
with the cost parameter  r.  12 Corollary 1 can be generalized  as follows:
Corollary  2:  The foreign firm  tmnsfers  less technology under acquisition
(0 =  1) than  under direct entry if  r < rt(n)  where
(  2(n 2 - n)
,rt (n)  =n 2 - n  - 1
Furthermore,  rt(n)  is  decreasing in  n  (as  n  approaches infinity,  rt(n)  ap-
proaches 2).
Thus,  again as in the monopoly case, direct entry may yield more technology
transfer  if r  is sufficiently small (i.e., the cost  function of technology transfer
is not  too  convex).  The intuition  as same  as before:  the  strategic  effect is
strong when r  is small.  The fact that  rt(n)  approaches 2 when n approaches
infinity  implies  that  when  the  domestic  market  is  extremely  competitive,
acquisition  delivers greater  technology transfer  (since r  cannot  be less than
2). The intuition for this result comes from proposition  5: when n is large, the
strategic  effect decreases with  n.  As a result,  the strategic  effect is stronger
12If a full acquisition were infeasible,  the dependence  of  XA  on  0 is of interest. In this
context, proposition 1 can be generalized as follows: The foreign firm transfers a better
technology  under acquisition than under direct entry iff a > Ot(n) where
-r(n3 + n2 - n-1)  - 2n(n  +±1)
Furthermore, (i) Se(n) is increasing in n (as n approaches infinity, At(n) approaches 1)
and (ii) strictly decreasing in T.
16under  acquisition  than  it is under  direct  entry.  Thus,  when n is large, both
the scale effect and the strategic effect are stronger under acquisition resulting
in greater  technology transfer.
3.3  Mode  of entry
As in the case of a single domestic firm, it is easy to show that full acquisition
is always optimal.  However, unlike in the benchmark  model, if one domestic
firm rejects the foreign firm's offer, it does not  automatically  imply that  the
foreign firm must  enter  directly  since it can acquire  another  domestic  firm.
We assume  that  the  transaction  price v at  which the  acquisition  occurs  is
i7h(xA):  the  profits  of a typical  home firm that  competes with  the acquired
firm.  The argument  for this  transaction  price is that  a firm that  agrees to
sell out to  a foreign firm should fare no worse than  those  that  compete  with
the new enterprise.1 3
Thus,  v =  7rA(xA),  and  the foreign firm opts  for an acquisition iff
AA(XA)  -7r7A(XA)  >  7rl(XE)
In  a  setup  without  technology transfer,  Kamien  and  Zang  (1990) have
shown that  the  foreign firm will always prefer  direct  entry  to  acquisition
when there  is  more than  one  firm  (n  >  3) in  the  domestic  market  (their
result  is reproduced  in  the  appendix).' 4 As shown  below, this  result  does
not hold in the presence of technology transfer.  The reason is that  the larger
degree of technology transfer  associated  with the stronger  scale effect under
13A  second  reasonable  candidate  for the  acquisition  price  is  7rh(xE):  the  profits  of
a  typical  domestic  firm  under  direct  entry.  Results  are  qualitatively  robust  to  such  an
assumption.  The  acquisition  price does  not  alter  the  nature  of the  product  market  equi-
librium;  it simply  affects the  preferences  of firms  (both  foreign and  domestic)  regarding
the  alternative  modes  of entry.
14Although the  formal  game they  analyze differ significantly  from  ours, the  mechanism
underlying  their  result  is also  behind  ours.
17acquisition results in a greater increase  in the relative profits of the acquired
firm, making acquisition more attractive than direct entry.
The foreign  firm prefers acquisition  to direct entry iff  rP  =r-rA-1rE  >
0. The expression for r  is quite cumbersome  and non-linear in r and n (see
the appendix). However,  dividing r  by (a - c) 2 and plotting the residual for
values of r  >  2 and n  >  3, yields the zero iso-net-profit surface shown in
Figure 1.
Thus for relatively low cost of technology transfer (2 <  r  <  2.5), the
foreign firm prefers acquisition to direct entry.  The lower the cost of tech-
nology transfer, the  smaller the profits of the typical domestic firm under
direct entry and therefore the lower  the acquisition price (v) collected by the
acquired domestic firm. Note also that  as n increases, direct entry becomes
more likely for a given cost of technology transfer (i.e., the iso-curves are
negatively slope in the space {r, n}).
Similarly,  when r is large, and n is small, an acquisition is unattractive to
the foreign  firm because of the high acquisition  price and because technology
transfer is of secondary  importance (due to its high cost). Under this scenario,
the considerations studied in Salant et.  al.  (1983) and Kamien and  Zang
(1990) dominate, making an acquisition less profitable than  direct entry.
However,  for small r, technology  transfer is an important consideration and
the foreign firm prefers acquisition to direct entry because the larger scale
effect  under acquisition makes the acquired firm more profitable. Thus, even
in relatively competitive markets, technology  transfer can make acquisition
more profitable than direct entry.
Next, we compare domestic welfare under acquisition with that  under
direct entry.  The trade-off between these regimes is clear from the domes-
tic viewpoint: acquisition may result in greater technology transfer whereas
direct entry encourages competition.
183.4  Domestic  welfare  under  oligopoly
Let  us  first  consider how consumers  and  producers  fare  under  alternative
entry modes.  We prove the following result in the appendix:
Proposition  6:  Regardless of the number of firms (n)  in the domestic mar-
ket and  the convexity of  the cost  of technology transfer  (-r),  consumers  are
better off under direct entry  than  under acquisition  (pA  >  pE)  whereas do-
mestic producers are better off under acquisition  (7rA  >  1rh ).1 5
Thus,  in the  oligopoly case, we have a conflict between the  interests  of do-
mestic  producers  and  consumers.  Given  this  conflict, the  main  question  is
whether total  domestic welfare (defined as the sum of consumer surplus and
producer  surplus)  is higher under  direct  entry or acquisition.  Let  ACS  de-
note the amount  by which consumer surplus under  acquisition falls short  of
consumer surplus  under direct  entry:
pA  (pB2-  A  A)2
'ACS =  =  [ap  2  apA_ -P  < 0  (11)
Similarly, let  APS  be  the amount  by which domestic  profits  are higher
under  acquisition relative to direct  entry:
APS  = (n -1)  [7r  -,rE]  >  °  (12)
Change in total  domestic welfare is then  defined as:
AW  = WA-_WE=  [apE  - 12  ]  [apA  - 2  ] +(n-1)  [7rA  - 7r]  (13)
As can be expected, the expression for (13) is quite complicated  and non
"5The  difference in prices  under  acquisition  and  direct  entry  declines  as the  number  of
firms increases.  At the  limit,  when n approaches  infinity, this  difference tends  to zero.
19linear  in r  and  n,  but  dividing  (13) by (a -c),  we can plot  the expression
as a fumction of r  and  n.
Figure  2 shows that  for low values of r,  welfare  is higher  under  direct
entry  than  under  acquisition.  The rationale  for this  result  is that  technol-
ogy transfer  is larger under  direct entry  than under  acquisition,  as the  scale
effect is dominated  by the  strategic  effect.  On the other  hand,  the  loss for
producers under  direct entry is large when r  is small since greater  technology
transfer implies that  the foreign firm is even more competitive than  it would
have been under  acquisition.  As this  occurs, the  relative importance  of the
increase in competition  (i.e., lower prices) associated  with direct  entry tends
to dominate.
Similarly, when  r  is large, domestic  welfare is higher  under  acquisition
relative to  direct  entry.  Clearly, this  result  contrasts  with  the  foreign firm's
preferences  over the  two  modes of entry,  which prefers  acquisition  for  low
values of r  and entry  for high values of r.
Thus,  again, as in the monopoly case, the interest  of the foreign firm may
be opposite to the interest  of the host country.  In the next section we explore
the policy implications  of this  conflict.
3.5  Government  intervention  under  oligopoly
To understand  under what  conditions policy intervention may be justified,  we
plot in figure 3, the zero level iso-curves of the change in welfare AW/  (a-c)  -
and  the difference in foreign firms profits r/(a  - c)
2 ,  i.e., the locus of (r; n)
at which they intersect  the zero surface.
Thus  for  a  given n,  and  high  r,  the  foreign firm prefers  direct  entry,
whereas the government  prefers acquisition.  For low levels of r, the opposite
is true  whereas  for intermediate  values of  r, both  the  government  and  the
20foreign firm prefer acquisition to direct  entry.16
Thus both,  in north-east  region ([A;E]) and the south-west  region ([E;A])
of figure 3 there  is room  for  government  intervention.  In  the  south-west
region, a restriction  on acquisitions may induce entry by the foreign firm (as
in our benchmark  model of domestic  monopoly).  Similarly, in the north-east
region, restricting  direct entry induces an acquisition by the foreign firm and
thereby  improves domestic welfare.
Policy interventions,  both in terms of foreign equity restrictions  and direct
entry may then be justified  in oligopolistic markets.  Note that  the  objective
of these policies interventions  is not  to  restrict  access by foreign firms into
the domestic  market,  but  rather  to induce a different mode  of entry.
Our results have some further  implications.  In industries  with more com-
plex technologies we should observed both  a higher cost of technology transfer
('r)  and  a  more concentrated  market  structure,  as the  cost  of entry  should
increase with  the  level of technological complexity.  In terms  of figure 3, in-
dustries  with complex technologies (services) will lie in the north-east  region
of the diagram,  whereas industries  with less complex technologies (manufac-
turing) will be lie in the south-west region of the  diagram.  If so, our analysis
indicates  that  governments  may have incentives  to  restrict  different  modes
of entry  by foreign firms depending  on the industry.  In services one  should
observe  restrictions  in terms  of the  number  of foreign firms allowed in the
market, whereas  in manufacturing  acquisition would be restricted  in order to
promote direct  entry by foreign firms.  This is broadly consistent  with the ev-
idence provided for different regions in OECD  (2001) and  UNCTAD (2000),
where  it  is reported  that  the  ratio  of foreign mergers and  acquisition  with
respect  to greenfield FDI  is much larger in services than  in manufacturing.
16Note  that  welfare may  be  higher under  acquisition  even  if direct  entry  leads  to more
technology  transfer  because  of the  fact that  producers  are  better  off under  acquisition.
214  Conclusion
The observation that  governments in developing countries praise the merits of
FDI  inflows may not necessarily be at odds with some of the restrictions  they
impose on FDI.  Equity  restrictions  that  limit ownership of existing  domestic
firms can be justified  if direct entry is welfare superior.  Similarly, restrictions
on direct  entry may be justified,  if acquisition offers a better  alternative  from
the  host country  perspective.
This  paper shows that  when a foreign firm faces high costs of technology
transfer,  it will generally prefer direct  entry  to  acquisition.  This  is because
a high  cost  of technology  transfer  is associated  with  a smaller  cost  advan-
tage over domestic  firms and  a  high acquisition  price.  The  government  on
the other  hand  will prefer acquisition  because it leads to  a  larger  extent  of
technology  transfer  by  the  foreign firm and  a relatively  higher  acquisition
price  for the  domestic  firm.  The  higher technology  transfer  under  acquisi-
tion partly  offsets its  anti-competitive  effect which when combined  with the
larger producer surplus under  acquisition makes it more attractive  relative to
direct  entry.  Thus,  when costs  of technology  transfer  increase  sharply  with
the extent  of technology  transfer,  restricting  direct  entry  in order  to  induce
acquisition,  even in highly concentrated  markets,  can help achieve a higher
level of welfare in the  host country.
On the other  hand,  if the cost  of technology  transfer  is low, the govern-
ment  prefers direct  entry  to  acquisition.  Under this  scenario,  direct  entry  is
not  only associated  with  a more competitive  domestic  market,  but  will also
brings more technology transfer  due to  the foreign firm's stronger  'strategic'
incentive to  transfer  technology.  But,  the foreign firm would rather  acquire
an existing  firm. Not  only  does acquisition  yield greater  market  power but
also  the  acquisition  price  is  small  when the  cost  of technology  transfer  is
low.  Under  this  scenario,  restricting  foreign equity  (i.e., acquisition)  in ex-
22isting domestic  firms becomes desirable if it help induce direct entry, even in
relatively  competitive markets.
Given our discussion above, it is clear that  for intermediate  levels of tech-
nology transfer,  both the government and the foreign firm prefer acquisition,
and therefore  there is no need for policy intervention.
The  policy  implications  of our analysis should  be treated  with  caution.
We have developed our results in a simple model under some special assump-
tions.  For  example,  domestic  entry,  licensing  agreements  or technological
spillovers are not considered.  However, the model offers some crisp  insights.
In  particular,  it  is difficult to  argue against  the  point  that  when a  foreign
firm has different modes of entering the domestic market,  its preferences need
not  align  perfectly  with  those  of the  domestic  economy.  This  divergence
stems  from the  different objectives of the foreign firm and  the  gDvernment.
Of course,  such a  divergence is almost  implied  by the  existence  of an  im-
perfectly competitive  market  structure,  something  our model assumes.  But
there  are good reasons to  argue that  services markets,  particularly  in those
in which technology  transfer  is an  important  consideration,  are usually not
perfectly competitive.  Furthermore,  it is well known that  multinational  firms
are found, by and  large, in oligopolistic industries.  As a result,  our analysis
is useful to  obtain  a better  understanding  of the implications  of mode choice
for technology  transfer  and welfare.
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255  Appendix
Here, we provide all analytical  derivations that  underlie  the results contained
in the body of the paper.
5.1  Model  with  domestic  monopoly
5.1.1  Cournot  competition
Each firm chooses  its output  qi to maximize its profits 7ri  =  (A - qi-q;-cjq
where  cf  =  c - x and  ch =  c.  The  first order  conditions  can be  solved for
eadh firm's equilibrium  output:
a - 2c7 +  Cj
qj=  2
Furthermore,  in equilibrium,  7ri  =  q2.
5.1.2  Tedhnology transfer  by the foreign firm
Under  acquisition, the  profit function of the foreign firm can be written  as
5rf(x) = orA(x)  = 0  aC+  2
whereas under  direct  entry
7rf(X)  [a-c+  2x]2
Recall from equation  (5) that,  the first  order  condition  for the choice of
x can be written  as
+  +  E_  dC(x) -
8qf  dx  9qh dx  Ox  dx
which for linear  demand  and  quadratic  cost  function  for technology  transfer
26can be written  as
3-TX  = 0
3
where a - c + 2x
qf=
5.2  Domestic  oligopoly
5.2.1  Cournot  competition
We directly report  the output  levels of all firms.  The output  of the acquired
firm is given by
A  =a+(n-1)x-c
n
whereas that  of a typical  domestic firm is given by
yA  a  a-c  -x  O  =l.-
Similarly, in case of direct  entry, we have
a+nx-c  .E  a-c-x
f  - ±n  + 1  and  n + 1  for h=  1...n-1.
5.2.2  Strategic  Incentive  for technology  transfer
Substituting  from the above expressions for equilibrium output  levels into the
first order conditions  reported  in the paper,  delivers equilibrium  technology
transfers  under  direct  entry  and acquisition reported  in the text.
The strategic  incentive for technology transfer  is given by
S(n,r)  _-(nn-  )qf  d:
It is easy to  show that  S(n, r) decreases with  r:
dS((n, r)  _  -2(n  - 1)(a -c)n2  0
dr  (-2n 2 +rn 2 +2rn+r) 2
27Furthermore,
dS(n,  r)  _-(a  - c)(-2n 2 +r 2 - 2-rn - 3r +  4n)-r
dn  (-2n 2 + rn2 + 2rn  + T) 2
which implies that
nc(r)  =  r2  +  v2/(r-2)  (2r -1)
Similarly,
dS(n,r)  >Owhenr<Tc(n)  2n(n-2)
dn  _n+  1)(n-3)
5.2.3  Mode  of entry
The foreign firn's  profits under acquisition, gross of the acquisition fee f,
are given by:
rA  AC  _2___  __
,  =  7rA=  (a  )  T(4 7r-7  2(-)7f  (14)
Under acquisition, the profits of a typical domestic firm are given by:
A-  [(a  - c)(rn+  2-  2  (15)
Under direct entry, foreign firm's profits equal:
T-f  (a  - c) 2 r  (16)
f  2n(,r  -n) +r(n2  +1(6
whereas that of a typical domestic firm equal:
s  [ (a-c)(nr-2n+r)  12(17)
lh  l2n(r  -n)  +  T(n2  +  1)7)
285.2.4  Proof  of proposition  6
We have
pA  pE  _  (a-c)[n 2(r - 2)2 + n(r 2 - 4) + 4r]  (18)
('  ((T-2)n 2 +i-(2n  +  1))((r-2)n 2 + 2(2n  - 1))
Since r > 2, the above expression is positive.
Domestic firms will always prefer acquisition to  direct  entry, i.e., for any
r  > 2. Using (15) and  (17),
7r4h7r'  =  (a-c) 2 n(nT  + r + 2-2n)(2nT  + -r-4n  + 2)(4n2 -4n 2 T  + n 2r
+  nr2 - 4n + 47)/(n2  -2n2  + 2nr +  r) 2(4n-  2n2 2+ n2r) 2(19)
Again,  since r > 2, the  above expression is also positive.
5.2.5  Parameter  restrictions
Restrictions  that  must be satisfied for the oligopoly case:
1.  c  >  XE  X
r >  D  2n(a + (n  - 1)c)
c(n + 1)2
2. c>xA  A# 2.  C >  xA  X  A  (n-  1)(a + (n -2)c)
Tr  >  =A ,(20)
cn2
3. For the second order condition  to hold in the choice of xA, we need
>  ,rAl  2(n  -1)
Ir>T  ~n2
4. For the second order condition  to  hold in the choice of XE,  we need
El  2n2
>  (n + 1)2  (21)
295. Domestic  firms produce a positive amount  under direct  entry  iff
r >  =EQ  _  +1  (22)
6. Domestic  firms produce a positive amount  under acquisition  iff
r>  TEQ =  20(n  - 1)
n
Note  that  if condition  5 holds,  6 automatically  does.  Similarly, if 4 holds, 3
does as well. Next,  we can show that  rEI  >  rE  iff
a
Similarly,
rAI  >  TA iff  a>  n
Thus,  we assume  the following conditions  throughout  the paper:
1.
a  >  n+1
c
i.e., demand  cost ratio  is high relative  to the number of firms.
2.
2n(a+  (n  - 1)c)
c(n +  1)2
i.e.  the  costs  of technology  transfer  rise  sharply  enough  to  guarantee  an
interior  solution.
5.2.6  Kamien  and  Zang  result
In the  absence of technology  transfer  and  in the  presence of more than  one
firm in  the  domestic  market,  the  foreign firm will  always  prefer  entry  to
acquisition as shown by Kamien  and Zang (1990).
In the presence of nT-I  firms in the domestic  market  (and in the  absence
of technology transfers,  profits of a Cournot  oligopolist  are given by:
30r(n) = (a-c)2  (23)
n
Assuming that  the foreign firm in case of acquisition  has  to pay  the do-
mestic firm, the profits  it will realize had  the foreign firm enter  the market
as a new firm, acquisition  will be preferred by the foreign firm if:
7r.-1 - 7rn  > 7rn X#~  rI = ?rn-1 - 27rn >  °  (24)
where 7rn-I stands  for the profits of each firm in a market  with n  - 1  firms.
Replacing  (23) into  (24), one obtains:
_C2n2  -2n  - 1
rI  -(a_  2  n2(n+  1)2  >0  (25)
It  is clear  that  for n  >  3 (i.e., duopoly  as  there  are n  - 1  firms in the
market),  rI  < 0.  Thus  direct  entry  is always preferred  to  acquisition.  The
only case where  acquisition  is preferred  to  direct  entry  is in the  monopoly
case (i.e., n =  2). Note that  as the number of firms in the market increase the
relative incentive for the foreign firm to enter through  acquisition declines.  At
the limit (when n approaches  infinity), the foreign firm is indifferent between
entering  through  acquisition or direct entry.
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